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Accounting and the Banality of Evil: 
Expropriation of Jewish Property  





Purpose ± This study identifies the significant role of accounting in the expropriation of 
Jewish real estate after the enforcement of race laZVXQGHU%HQLWR0XVVROLQL¶V)DVFLVWUHJLPH
in Italy. 
Design/methodology/approach ± +DQQDK$UHQGW¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIJRYHUQPHQW
bureaucracy in 20th century totalitarian regimes informs the research which draws upon a 
wide range of primary sources. 
Findings ± Implementation of the program of expropriation was the responsibility of a 
government body, EGELI, which was created specifically for this purpose. The language of 
accounting provided the means to disguise the nature and brutality of the process and allow 
bureaucrats to be removed from the consequences of their actions. Accounting reports from 
EGELI to the Ministry of Finance confirmed each year that those who worked in EGELI were 
devoted to its mission as an agency of the Fascist State. 
Research limitations/implications ± The paper refers to the Jews expropriation from the 
)DVFLVWLQVWLWXWLRQVSRLQWRIYLHZZKLOHWKH-HZV¶GRFXPHQWVDQGWKHLUHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQG
human lives were not considered. It paved the way to further research about Jews 
discrimination and persecution in European countries other than Nazi Germany from an 
Accounting History viewpoint.  
Originality/value ± The paper is the first contribution coming from Italy about the role 
played by Accounting and Accountants in Jews persecution under the Fascism.  
Keywords ± Jews, Race laws, Italian Fascism, accounting, expropriation of property, 
bureaucracy, EGELI.  






After Mussolini entered into an alliance with Hitler in 1936 Fascist Italy embarked upon a 
program of anti-Semitism. Race laws which were promulgated by the Italian Fascists in 1938-
39 resulted in severe restrictions on the rights of Italian Jews, including their right to own 
property. Tragically, the expropriation of Jewish property by the Fascist government became 
the prelude to the ultimate, attempted annihilation of Italian Jews by the Nazis after the 
surrender of Italy. The persecution of Italian Jews had never been the original aim of the 
Fascists when they came to power in 1922 and anti-Semitic measures were never intended to 
be a prelude to the destruction of Italian Jews. In Italy, the expropriation of Jewish property 
was mainly the responsibility of a new government body established in 1939, the Ente di 
Gestione e Liquidazione Immobiliare1 (hereafter referred to as EGELI). EGELI was an 
independent organization of the Finance Ministry with its own boards and staff who were 
specially selected from outside the Ministry to ensure that it would be operated by bureaucrats 
who would be committed to the Fascist racist program (Mann, 2000). EGELI operated 
throughout the Fascist regime (1939-43) and into the time of the Italian Social Republic, the 
Repubblica di Salò (1943-45). It was still in existence when Italy was proclaimed a republic 
in 1946, surviving until 1997 to address ongoing litigation arising out of claims on 
expropriated, but unsold, real estate. This study focuses on the role of EGELI in the 
expropriation of Jewish property from the time that race laws were promulgated by the Fascist 
government in Rome in 1938 until 1943 when EGELI was moved from Rome during the 
invasion of the Anglo-American allied forces. 
 
Expropriation of Jewish property during and before the Second World War has been 
investigated extensively in connection with Nazi Germany (Safrian, 2000; James, 2001; Bopf, 
2003; Dean, 2002; 2003; 2011) and in Nazi-occupied countries such as Holland (Van 
Renselaar, 2000; Van Tielhof, 2005), Belgium (Fraser, 2004), Hungary (Don, 1986), Norway 
(Cotler, 1998), and Czechoslovakia (Hochstein, 1996). In this process the Nazi bureaucracies 
responsible endeavoured to use accounting to purify their expropriation and disposal of the 
vast amount of property taken from the Jews by using the identification and recording of 
property provided by accoXQWLQJDVDPHDQVWRWUDQVIRUPDQGµSXULI\¶ZKDWKDGEHHQµGHILOHG¶
when owned by the Jews into property which could be at the service of the Aryan German 
State (Funnell, 2013). Although there was a close, indeed dependent, association between the 
contributions of accounting and the Nazi extermination process, Annisette (2009, p.457) has 
FODLPHG WKDW ³LQ UHDOLVLQJ WKH GLDEROLFDO 1D]L GUHDP WKH FXOSDELOLW\ RI DFFRXQWDQWV DQG
accountancy remains under-VFUXWLQLVHG´ 
 
In the persecution of Italian Jews by EGELI, prior to and during the Second World War, 
accounting played a significant role in exposing and managing property in the expropriation 
process. Crucially, the language of accounting provided the means to disguise the nature and 
brutality of the process and allow the bureaucrats of EGELI, who were fully aware of the 
nature of their work, to be removed from the ultimate consequences of their actions. Although 
there is no evidence either in practice or ideology that the Italian Fascists sought to assist the 
Nazis in the annihilation of the Jewish race, WKHµ)LQDO6ROXWLRQ¶ the work of EGELI shows 
that there was a similar level of disengagement by Italian bureaucrats from any moral 
responsibility for their actions and similar claims of ignorance and innocence to those of 
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German bureaucrats who implemented the Final Solution with great efficiency. The process 
carried out by EGELI was organized so as to avoid direct contact between Italian Jews and 
government officials, thereby ensuring that the impact of a bureDXFUDW¶V DFWLRQV ZRXOG QRW
have been obvious to them. The Italian Jews affected were merely represented by a file. 
 
This study is informed by the ideas developed in the well-known writing of Hannah Arendt, 
mainly about Adolf Eichman who had been primarily responsible for implementing the Final 
Solution2. $UHQGW¶VZRUNKDVSURYLGHG VLJQLILFDQW FRQWULEXWLRQV WRRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKH
motivations and justifications of those who implemented the Final Solution (Arendt, 1958; 
see also Canovan, 1994; Villa, 19991RUEHUJ$UHQGW¶VNH\finding is that, like many 
other Nazi leaders, Eichmann considered himself not a criminal but a scrupulous bureaucrat; a 
view which did not depend on his immorality but on the nature and responsibilities of the 
bureaucracy in which he worked (Mack, 2010)3. Hitler believed that it was the responsibility 
RI WKH6WDWH WRSURWHFW WKHSXULW\RI*HUPDQEORRGDQG WKDW LWZDV WRDFW³ZLWKRXW UHJDUG WR
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRUODFNRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDSSURYDORUGLVDSSURYDO´+LWOHU1939, pp.358, 359).  
 
$UHQGW¶VKLJKO\LQIOXHQWLDOWKHRU\RIWKHQDWXUHRIEXUHDXFUDF\LVshown in this study to be not 
exclusive to understanding the horror of the Holocaust as perpetrated by the German Nazis, 
which prompted her work. Thus, examination of the persecution of the Jews under the Italian 
Fascists enables further confirmation of the incisive veracity of her theoretical insights about 
the essential contributions of bureaucracies and the importance of accounting practices to the 
success of this work without the need for considerations of morality. Very importantly, a 
primary motivation of this study of the Italian Fascists is the opportunity that it provides to 
LGHQWLI\ QXDQFHV RU YDULDWLRQV LQ WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK $UHQGW¶V WKHRU\ RI WKH EDQDOLW\ RI
bureaucracies might be applicable in other contexts to which she alluded, which included 
Italy, but which have obtained little prominence in contrast to her conclusions about the 
Nazis. Most especially, this study exposes the way in which Italian bureaucrats did not take 
their role as a facilitator of Fascist anti-Semitic programs to the heinous extremes of the 
Nazis. Unlike the Nazis, who were renowned for their zealous pursuit of the destruction of 
European Jews, in Italian bureaucracies the implementation of anti-Semitic measures was 
never consistent or reliable. It was this well-known unreliability of Italian government 
bureaucracies that prompted the Fascists to recruit for EGELI a select body of committed 
Fascist bureaucrats. 
 
This study draws upon many different sources. Access to the laws, which provided the ability 
and authority to oppress Italian Jews and which governed the operations of EGELI was 
obtained from the records of the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Italy and of the 
Repubblica di Salò(*(/,¶VDGministrative and accounting records, including Management 
Board Minutes, Annual Financial Statements and Auditor Reports, are located in 5RPH¶V
Central State Archive4. The Minutes, typewritten in an officially endorsed register, provide a 
complete record oI (*(/,¶V RSHUDWLRQV VKRZLQJ in chronological order how and why 
decisions were made and how they would be enacted. Articles published in La Stampa, one of 
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3
 Arendt attended the trial of Eichmann where, in contrast to the horrific acts of mass murder in which he 
colluded, she was confronted by the banality of Eichmann the man, rather than the person with considerable 
lethal power exercising an official role. 
4
 The Central State Archive is the official repository of the documents from Central Government, the Parliament, 




the most popular newspapers of the time, provide insights into the responses of the Italian 
public to the race laws5. 
 
The paper proceeds firstly with a discussion of the theoretical framework adopted from the 
work of Arendt. This is followed by a review of the accounting literature on the role of 
accounting in the racist programs of the Nazi totalitarian regime in Germany, which sought 
the annihilation of the Jewish race as efficiently as possible. Particular emphasis is given to 
the way in which accounting practices provided the means by which Nazi civil and military 
bureaucracies, which perpetrated and implemented the Holocaust would claim ignorance and, 
thus, their alleged innocence. The focus of the paper then moves to Fascist Italy with a 
description of the stages of discrimination and persecution of Jews in Italy during the twenty 
years of Fascist dictatorship. The institutional, organizational and operational profile of 
EGELI is then examined. Subsequent sections develop the essential role played by accounting 
in the expropriation and sale of Jewish property and the rhetoric that was associated with 
accounting which betrayed the anti-Semitic purposes of accounting practices. Particular 
emphasis is placed upon the nature of the discourse created by bureaucratic language and the 
way accounting as a technology of racist policies and programs helped to disassociate 
organizational processes from the µadministrative evil¶. Finally, the paper discusses the 
findings and the conclusions. 
 
Bureaucracy and Accounting for the Banality of Evil 
The culpability of the Nazi civil and military bureaucracies, which perpetrated and 
implemented the Holocaust has been especially highlighted in numerous studies which have 
emphasised the way in which these individuals managed to disjoin operationally, mentally 
and morally their administrative actions from the homicidal outcome of their actions 
(Lippman and Wilson, 2013). The common defence later of those who participated when 
DFFXVHGRIWKHLUFRPSOLFLW\LQWKH1D]L¶VKHLQRXVFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\ZRXOGEHWKDWWKH\
had no knowledge of the ultimate consequences of their otherwise apparently innocuous 
actions when, for example, organising transport to take the Jews to destinations across Europe 
at which the mass killings would take place.  
 
$UHQGW UHIHUV WR DQ ³DGPLQLVWUDWLYH HYLO´ ZKHUHE\ WKH DFWLRQV RI KXPDQ EHLQJV XQMXVWO\ or 
needlessly inflict pain and suffering, and even death, on others (Arendt 1964; Adams and 
Balfour, 2009; Adams, 2011). Thus, the focus shifts from the extermination camp torturers to 
the hundreds of thousands of ordinary people involved in the organization of the 
extraordinary logistical, financial and productive processes which made the Holocaust both 
possible and efficient. %DXPDQ  UHLQIRUFHG $UHQGW¶V FRQFOXVLRQV E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH
devastating extent of the Holocaust was mainly made possible by the unquestioning 
organizational efficiency of the bureaucracies involved. Both Bauman and Arendt find that 
genocide of such proportions could not have been possible without a vast, fatally efficient 
organizational machine which involved many thousands of people who carried out their 
responsibilities without being impeded by any moral considerations other than their devotion 
WR WKH 1D]L¶V $U\DQLVDWLRQ PLVVLRQ LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU D JUHDW QXPEHU RI
victims (Hilberg 1993; Goldhagen 1996; Browning 1983).  
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organizational build-up and far too pervasive in its administrative implementation to dispense 
with specialized bureaucrats in every segment of socLHW\´5RVHQEHUJSKDVFDOOHG
WKHVHPRVWO\ DQRQ\PRXV WHFKQRFUDWV µGHVN-NLOOHUV¶ZKRNLOOHG³IURPEHKLQG DGHVNZLWKRXW
wielding any weapons more lethal than a typewriter that issues reports dealing out death ... 
along deliberately anonymous channels or through a labyrinth of bureaucratic routines and 
DSSDUDWXV´ 5RVHQEHUJS+LOEHUJS$FFRUGLQJ WR5RVHQEHUJ 
S WKH +RORFDXVW UHVXOWHG LQ WKH ³FRUUXSWLRQ RI UDWLRQDOLW\ LQWR LGHRORJLFDO IRUPV RI
IXQFWLRQDO UHDVRQLQJ´ whereby technologies of calculation, most importantly accounting, 
were used to  
reduce human beings to quantified objects, thus eliminating their troublesome qualities 
of humaneness .... Functional reason must treat people as objects, as things, as mere 
numbers that can be easily manipulated and casually disposed of .... It allows 
individuals to manipulate fellow human beings as things until they were done away with 
when no longer perceived as useful or needed (Rosenberg, 1983, p.12). 
 
The moral aloofness of the Nazi organizations responsible for the implementation of the Final 
Solution, most notoriously the Schutzstaffel (SS) under Heinrich Himmler, meant that they 
focussed on efficient routines and attention to outputs; the number of people processed and 
subsequently killed. According to this interpretation of the role of the Nazi bureaucracy, the 
Final Solution was the routine product of bureaucratic procedures, means-ends analysis, 
budget balancing, and the application of universal rules, rather than the moral deficiencies of 
SDUWLFXODU LQGLYLGXDOV$FFRUGLQJO\ WKH+RORFDXVWZDVQRWDQµLQWHQVLYHHYLO¶PDGHSRVVLEOH
E\ D IHZ SHRSOH DSSHDULQJ LQ EHDVWO\ IRUPV EXW DQ µH[WHQVLYH HYLO¶ ZKLFK DOWKRXJK QRW
apparent at the time, was widespread and organised (Minnich, 2013). Arendt therefore 
emphasises the instrumental rationality of Nazi bureaucracy in a Weberian sense, which 
encompasses the technologies necessary to allow it to do its work. Most especially, and 
tragically, accounting provided the means for the Germans to manage in an efficient way the 
resources required for the collection and transportation of Jews and the management of the 
H[WHUPLQDWLRQFDPSVLQFOXGLQJWKHVHL]XUHDQGGLVSRVDORIWKHSULVRQHUV¶SURSHUW\ 
 
A government bureaucracy is meant to treat all citizens the same. If, however, equality of 
treatment is no longer a fundamental right of citizens, such as with the race-based 
discrimination suffered by European Jews, then bureaucrats will work as implements of 
legally sanctioned discrimination and oppression. The moral value of the consequences of 
organizational actions will then depend on the assumption that members of the population, 
which have been identified and vilified as different races have different rights (Shenhav, 
2013). This requires that bureaucracies should act only in a manner which is specified by laws 
and regulations, not moral imperatives. The result is that morality is no longer a characteristic 
of individuals but a collective legitimation of an action (Bos, 1997). Actions that in other 
contexts could be regarded as a crime, especially when carried out on a large scale, are 
legitimised as the exercise of State power by bureaucrats who rely on the banality of the evil 
in which they colluded to µPHUHO\¶LPSOHPHQWWKHUHJLPH¶V policies as required by law (Mann, 
2000). Rose (1999, p.26) believes that the strength of the Nazi extermination project lay in the 
³FDSDFLW\ WR UHQGHU LWVHOI WHFKQLFDO WR FRQQHFW LWVHOI XS ZLWK DOO PDQQHUV RI WHFKQRORJLHV
capable of implementing its nighWPDULVK GUHDPV LQWR HYHU\GD\ H[LVWHQFH´ Technologies of 
total institutional power, notably accounting, are based on the construction of categories of 
individuals, the application of intrinsically instrumental and value-free science, the 






The instrumental rationality of government bureaucracies and their dependence upon 
accounting practices as implements of power and even genocide have also been extensively 
documented in imperial contexts by Neu (2000a, 2000b) and Neu and Graham (2006; see also 
Davie 2000; Rodrigues and Sangster, 2013; Davie, 2005; Graham, 2009; Chwastiak, 2015). 
Accounting numbers have been shown to enable bureaucratic bodies, both civil and military, 
and their masters to control from a distance by capturing key dimensions of the process 
without being in constant attendance (Miller, 1990, p.318; Neu and Graham 2006, p.51). 
Thus, in the pursuit of the implementation of these policies moral culpability for heinous acts 
is disguised and subsequently denied.  
 
The bureaucratic mechanisms and the associated accounting practices of the Nazi 
bureaucracies were also prominent features of the organizationVVHWXSE\0XVVROLQL¶V)DVFLVW
regime for the seizure of property owned by Italian Jews as part of their program of Jewish 
persecution. Accounting numbers were substituted by Italian bureaucracies for qualitative 
attributes of individuals, thereby denying them their humanity and individuality (Annisette, 
2009; Funnell, 1998, 2013, 2015). In this travesty of facts and separation of responsibilities 
the role of accounting was decisive. According to Fleischman and Funnell (2007, p.384), 
ultimately this separation from morality allowed by DFFRXQWLQJ ³ZDV QRW only a means of 
expediting the annihilation of the Jews, but was also one of the means by which people who 
had no direct involvement in the murder of millions of Jews were able to divorce themselves 
IURPWKHREMHFWLYHVDQGFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHLUZRUN´In the work of EGELI the bureaucratic 
organization and its members were removed from the consequences of their decisions, 
thereby allowing their individual moral culpability to be separated from the morality of the 
decision (Clegg et al, 2003). Although Fascism was a movement in search of a specific Italian 
race, and therefore acquired racist characteristics, its rise was not built on racism, unlike 
Germany where the Nazis¶ ascendency was based on racist, anti-Semitic roots and later an 
µH[WHUPLQDWLRQLVW¶DQWL-Semitic policy (Raspanti, 1994; Pollard 1998). 
 
Racial Laws and the Persecution of Jews in Fascist Italy (1938-1945) 
According to many historians, when Mussolini took power in 1922, he and his acolytes were 
indifferent to explicit racist ideologies; there was an absence of racial anti-Semitism (Spinosa, 
1994; Pollard 1998, p.125). In the first few years of power the Fascist regime demonstrated no 
obvious antipathy towards Jews, nor did Jews appear to be opposed to Fascism. Indeed, many 
Jews, especially the working and middle classes who lived in the cities, had joined the Fascist 
March on Rome while nearly 5,000 Jews joined the Fascist movement (De Felice, 1974, 
1993; Pollard 1998, p.126). In addition, in the first 15 years of the Fascist dictatorship Jewish 
citizens held many important public offices within the regime, including the Minister of 
Finance, Guido Jung, and membership of Gran Consiglio del Fascismo (Advisory Council of 
the Prime Minister) (Rossi, 2003). Many Jewish intellectuals had endorsed the Fascist 
manifesto drawn up in 1925 by Giovanni Gentile, philosopher and Minister of Education 
(Turi, 1980). Remarkably, one of the Dux¶s closest and most educated lovers, Margherita 
Sarfatti, whom he frequently relied on for advice, was Jewish (Wieland, 2010). In September 
1934, when speaking to the crowds in Bari, Mussolini stigmatised the racist and anti-Semitic 
attitude of Nazi Germany, which he FRQWUDVWHGZLWK,WDO\¶V distinctive culture and values that 
ZHUH³DERYH´VXFKUDFLVWGRFWULQHV0XVVROLQL4)6. Indeed, Mussolini saw himself as the 
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protector of Italian Jews. Despite these assurances, the political and social conditions of the 
Italian Jews declined shortly thereafter.  
 
The worsening situation of the Jews was driven initially by the continuing depressive effects 
on the Italian economy of the First World War, later compounded by the 1929 world financial 
crisis which led the Fascist regime and a large number of Italian businessmen to seek 
someone to blame for their problems. Most especially this fuelled the negative myth of Jewish 
capitalism as predatory and damaging for the Italian middle classes (Leon, 1970). At the same 
time, the regime had also implemented a policy that discriminated against the native 
populations of the Italian colonies in Africa. This was justified by the emerging Fascist 
ideology that proclaimed Italians to be a superior, pure race (Cassata, 2008). Ultimately, the 
decision to promote an anti-Jewish racial policy was most powerfully driven by the 
international political isolation that followed the Ethiopian war (1935-36) and the fines levied 
by the League of Nations (Del Prato, 1938). With Italy having lost its authoritative role 
among the European powers Mussolini had to create stronger relationships with the Nazis. 
Even if not expressly forced to do so by the Führer, Mussolini embraced an anti-Semitic 
policy that, at least in theory, resonated with that of Germany so that he could demonstrate 
ERWKKLVDQG,WDO\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR+LWOHU¶V political and cultural positions (Michaelis, 1982; 
Sarfatti, 1994).  
 
The first stage in the Fascist racial program began with the publication of the so-called 
³Manifesto of Race´, hereafter the Manifesto, a 10-Article paper called µIl Fascismo e i 
problemi della razza¶ (Fascism and the Problem of Race) published in the newspaper Il 
*LRUQDOHG¶,WDOLD on the 15th July, 1938. The Manifesto, produced by a group of university 
scholars and intellectuals, defended the concept of a pure Italian race and claimed that 
Fascism had to have a racist attitude, which was the ultimate expression of the true traits of 
the Italian people (Anonymous, 1938a; Romano, 1941). The Manifesto was reported by other 
newspapers and republished in August of the same year by the recently founded journal La 
difesa della razza (Defending Race). The Manifesto provided Fascism with the cultural and 
pseudoscientific justifications for the discriminatory and segregationist claims it was 
developing and promoting (Gillette, 2002). Shortly after, on the 19th September 1938, during 
a public speech in Trieste, Mussolini stated for the first time that Italy had a problem with the 
Jews. Mussolini described Jews as the enemies of Fascism who were involved in an 
international subversive plan, which threatened the well-being and the very existence of Italy 
(Mussolini, 1938a).  
 
To achieve the racist aims of the Fascists, to discriminate and persecute a minority, a legal 
concept of race was required as the foundation of civil and economic rights (Yael Franzone, 
2004). The state and its bureaucracies needed to be able to identify members of the population 
as belonging to different races with different rights (Shenhav, 2013). Thus, Section 1 of a 
µQHZ¶&LYLO&RGHSURYLGHGZLWKWKH'HFUHHVWDWHGWKDW: ³/HJDOFDSDFLW\FDQEHUHVWULFWHG
with respect to the belonging to a race. Such restrictions are regulated by special laws7´ 
(Royal Decree, December 12, 1938, no. 1852). This required a definition of the Jewish Race 
to draw clear boundaries between Jews and the rest of the Italian population. This was 
provided in Sec. 8 of the November 17, 1938, Decree 1728. In order to avoid a religious 
definition of the Jew, the Fascist government adopted a racial pseudo-scientific definition 
based on that which was published by La difesa della razza. The adoption of a pseudo-
scientific definition which emphasised the existence of a Jewish race, which originated with 
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Semitic people who were spread throughout Mediterranean lands and maintained specific 
racial characteristics, provided the means to discriminate against Jewish people even if they 
had converted to Catholicism and did not practice the Jewish faith. Thus, the German 
definition of Jew was very similar to that adopted by the Italians. 
 
The second stage in the development of the racial policy of the Fascist regime consisted of the 
promulgation of many laws and rules designed to discriminate against Jews in the economic 
and social life of Italy. Ambegan (2005) has identified the withdrawal of social and economic 
rights as the first stages in the denial of the humanity of those affected. The first racial laws, 
as seen in Table 1, were targeted at Jewish students and especially Jewish teachers who were 
expelled from schools at all levels and banned from teaching (RdI, 1938a). Soon after, Jewish 
executives and clerks, both public and private, were forced to leave their jobs, as were Jews in 
the army and the police (RdI, 1938a; 1938d; Gentile, 2013). Legal protection was further 
restricted, which meant that Italian Jews could not work as self-employed professionals in 
trade or services (RdI, 1939a, 1939b, 1940) while in 1942 Jews were banned from the 
performing arts. They were also denied the right to own property when on the 6th October 
1938 a meeting of the Gran Consiglio del Fascismo DQQRXQFHG WKDW ³,WDOLDQ FLWL]HQs of a 
-HZLVKUDFH«DUHQRWDOORZHG«WREHRZQHUVRIPRUHWKDQKHFWDUV´RIIDUPODQG6HF
d). This was followed soon after on 17th November by Decree 1728, Sec. 10, subsequently 
approved without debate by the Chamber of Deputies on the 14th December8, which set limits 
on the value of real estate that Jews could own. The limit for ³,WDOLDQFLWL]HQVRID-HZLVKUDFH
«´ ZDVEDVHGRQµFDGDVWUDO¶UHQW9and set at 5,000 lire for land and 20,000 lire for buildings 
(RdI, 1938c, Sec. 10, d, e). Initially, only property which exceeded these limits was the target 
for expropriation. Thus, not all property was to be forfeited. If property exceeded the stated 
limits the owners had to inform the Ministry of Finance within ninety days. 
 
To placate potential opposition, the Decree was justified with reference to the many houses 
allegedly owned by Jews as investments but which were left vacant at a time when many 
Italians were unable to find a place to live. Thus, State intervention and public ownership of 
these buildings was said to be necessary to ensure better access to property for the majority of 
Italians (Anonymous, 1938a). Mussolini said that he wanted Italian Jews to have a social and 
economic importance in proportion to their number. $FFRUGLQJO\DµSURSRUWLRQDO FULWHULD¶ZDV
adopted by the Regime. At the time, Jews represented approximately 1/1000 of the Italian 
population. Therefore, according to the Fascists their share of national wealth should not have 
exceeded 1/1000. However, the Fascists warned that this was well below the actual proportion 
of property that Italian Jews owned and, thus, would mean that Jewish properties should be 
gradually sold to achieve the appropriate proportion (Anonymous, 1938b, 1939d). To support 
the expropriation of Jewish property the newspapers exaggerated the extent of property 
owned and controlled by Jews (Anonymous, 1938c). In one case the Turin-based newspaper 
La Stampa SXEOLVKHGDQDUWLFOHZKLFKSURFODLPHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³7KH-HZLVK2FWRSXV
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 Chamber of Deputies, CXLVIL 2a Tornata di mercoledì 14 dicembre 1938. Anno XVII, Resoconto 
stenografico, pp.5609-5610. 
9
 In Italy, the base for taxes on land and on building was (and still is) related not to the market value or the price 
RIWKHSURSHUW\DFWXDOO\SDLGEXWWRDµFRQYHQWLRQDO¶YDOXHwhich is normally lower than the current market prices 
and is related to the cadastral income listed in the registers held by the Land Registry Office. The conventional 
value is obtained by multiplying the cadastral income by a coefficient (generally between 33 and 100). 
This calculation was adopted also in the case of Jewish property expropriation.  
As laid down by Act 126 of 1939, the following equations were used to calculate the conventional value of the 
land or the building: 
Value of land =  80 ×  Taxable rent as of February 1939. 




Jews own more than 1 billion OLUH UHDO HVWDWH SURSHUW\´ $QRQ\PRXV E F
'LIILFXOWLHV LQ LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKHµSURSRUWLRQDOFULWHULD¶PHDQW WKDW LWZDVTXLFNO\DEDQGRQHG




Table 1 about here 
 
The extent to which the Italian State bureaucracy was committed to the racial laws remains a 
very controversial issue. Some historians have sought to understate the actual pervasive effect 
of the oppressive measures introduced by the racial laws, claiming that the regime was only 
seemingly racist and that it introduced its racist policies to please Hitler without any real 
commitment or belief in what the new racial laws sought to achieve. According to this view, 
Italian bureaucrats, therefore, did not effectively or widely enforce the racial laws (De Felice, 
1993). Arendt (1964, p.177) was strongly convinced that the condition of the Jews in Italy 
was not comparable to the suffering they endured in the other European countries which were 
either directly or indirectly controlled by Nazi Germany. She argues that Italian society and 
its institutions were basically indifferent, if not always openly hostile, to the anti-Semitic 
racial laws and that, unlike Germany, anti-Semitism had never been a prominent or recurring 
feature of the culture and history of Italy. ³Italy actually was one of the few countries in 
Europe where all anti-Jewish measures were decidedly unpopular, since, in the words of 
&LDQRWKH\³UDLVHGDSUREOHPZKLFKIRUWXQDWHO\GLGQRWH[LVW´´ (Arendt, 1964, pp.178-180). 
This was confirmed when, despite the racist escalation of the laws, regulations and 
bureaucratic measures of oppression, there was no attempt by large numbers of Italian Jews to 
leave the country, thus possibly confirming the belief of Italian Jews in the indifference or 
resistance of the Italians to the persecution of their fellow citizens (Toscano, 1998). The 
majority of ,WDO\¶V-HZLVK population, still confident in the institutions and in the legal system 
inherited from the liberal era, believed that they would overcome what was assumed to be a 
short-lived adverse period and, therefore, chose to stay in Italy (Antonucci and Spizzichino, 
2004; Livingston, 2014).  
 
Tragically, for many Italian Jews their faith in Italian history and its people was to be finally 
and fatally betrayed when after Italy entered the Second World War on the 10th June 1940 the 
Fascist regime collected in detention centres those who could be identified as Jews according 
to the Manifesto of Race. However, unlike the detention centres operated by the German 
Nazis, there was no forced labour, nor were they meant to be the prelude to the methodical, 
relentless killing of Italian Jews. The collection of Jews was facilitated by a census conducted 
in 1938, which comprehensively recorded and classified nearly 48,000 Italians as Jewish who 
were thus treated as not part of an Italian race. This led to the formation of a special statistic-
demographic office, the DemoRazza, to manage statistical data about Italian Jews (Cocchi and 
Favero, 2009). On the 4th September 1940, Mussolini signed a ruling that opened in Italy the 
first of 43 concentration camps for captured citizens from enemy countries, most especially 
Jews, with a view to expelling them from Italy (Calimani, 2013).  
 
After the surrender of Italy to the Allies in September 1943, German forces occupied northern 
and central Italy and began a major round up of Jews. The census of 1938 provided the 
Germans with the means to apprehend quickly Jews for transportation to the extermination 
camps who had been previously allowed by the Fascists to remain free. The inmates of the 
concentration camps established by the Fascists in areas now occupied by the Germans also 




subsequently died in the Nazi extermination camps, mainly Auschwitz-Birkenau (US 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, Italy, 2016). The relatively small number of Italian Jews who 
were killed in the extermination camps, when compared to other countries under German 
control, has been attributed to both the general reluctance of Italian bureaucrats and the police 
to search for Jews and the preparedness of non-Jewish Italians to protect their neighbours and 
colleagues (Friedlander 2007, p.561). Count Ciano, Foreign Minister of Fascist Italy from 
 XQWLO  DQG 0XVVROLQL¶V VRQ-in-law, was criticised by Heinrich Himmler for not 
ensuring that more Jews were being sent to detention centres (Guerri, 1979).  
 
EGELI and the Seizure of Property 
Implementation of anti-Semitic policies by the Fascists required the creation of new 
bureaucratic institutions specifically designed to implement effectively the UHJLPH¶V racial 
policies. Accordingly, EGELI was created by Royal Decree 126 in 1939 (Anonymous, 1938d; 
RdI, 1939) as a body under the Ministry of Finance dedicated to managing the property seized 
from Jewish families and businesses until the property was sold. The work of EGELI also 
played a key role in Fascist propaganda. Thus, as soon as EGELI commenced its operations 
the press regularly reported its actions and gave particular prominence to the expropriation of 
any property that exceeded limits, which had been set for the value of property that Jews 
could own (Anonymous, 1939a, 1939b). As early as the middle of 1939 La Stampa gave a 
prominence and place to the work of EGELI and frequently gave specific details of the extent 
of Jewish ownership of property (Anonymous, 1939c, 1939d, 1939e)10.  
 
To carry out its work of expropriation and sale of Jewish property on a national scale, EGELI 
needed to work closely with other government institutions (Adams and Balfour, 2009), 
notably the Revenue Assessment Office and the Revenue Office, and banks (Allen, 2005; 
Browning, 1992; Naumann, 1966). EGELI did not commence its work until the last few 
months of 1939, becoming fully operational under the Act 1994/1940 in 1940 after Italy 
entered the war. It also became responsible for the expropriation and management of the real 
estate of citizens of enemy countries who were living in Italy (RdI, 1940). In addition, EGELI 
collected the so-FDOOHGµEHQLHVDWWRULDOL¶WKH,WDOLDQWD[SD\HUV¶DVVHWVWKDWWKH5HYHQXH2IILFH
could seize to satisfy a tax liability. Initially EGELI was to have been staffed by a head 
accountant, a chief legal officer who would be assisted by an Attorney General, two record-
keepers, two typists and two bailiffs (EGELI, 1939a). 
 
(*(/,¶VJRYHUQDQFHV\VWHPwas centred on a Board of Directors chosen by the government, 
which was composed of ten members, three of whom had to be senators, thereby confirming 
the importance given to the work of EGELI. The first president of EGELI was Senator 
Asinari di Bernezzo, who died shortly after his appointment. His successor, Dr Giovara, who 
was a lawyer and also a senator, was appointed on the 7th September 1939 and stayed in office 
until the end of the Second World War (EGELI, 1939c, p.16). The Board of Directors was 
supported by a five-member Management Board (EGELI, 1939a) and a Board of Statutory 
Auditors. The rules governing the work of the Board of Statutory Auditors were contained in 
Article 12 of the charter under which EGELI was to operate (RdI, 1939d). Three auditors 
were appointed for three years personally by the Duce, again reinforcing the importance of 
EGELI for Fascist plans. The president of the Board of Statutory Auditors had to be chosen 
among the judges of the Court of Auditors while the other two members were proposed by the 
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Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Corporations 11. In addition to auditing financial 
statements, the auditors, whose fees were determined by the Ministry of Finance, were 
responsible for ensuring compliance of the Board of DLUHFWRUV¶ GHFLVLRQV ZLWK )DVFLVW ODZV
DQG UHJXODWLRQV ³LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ DV LQ WKH SULYDWH FRPSDQLHV´12. The audit reports of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors had to be presented to the Ministry of Finance. In order to 
prevent conflict of interests, according to the Article 26 of the EGELI charter the auditors 
(and the directors) were forbidden to buy properties from EGELI.  
 
EGELI developed associations with many banks. Although the banks, as noted in Table 2, 
were mainly small local banks, there were also some large banks which were publicly owned, 
including the Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, and Banco 
di Napoli. The banks organised the auctions of expropriated Jewish property, in return for 
expenses and commissions (RdI, 1939d; 1941).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Within ninety days of the issuance of the ruling in December 1938 for the approved limit to 
the value of property, Jewish Italian citizens had to notify local agencies of the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ufficio Tecnico Erariale (Revenue Offices)13, of the property that they owned. 
After receiving this information the Revenue Offices determined if there was any property, 
that exceeded the limits specified and, if so, they then expropriated the property (Anonymous, 
1939e). In another remarkable difference with the Germans, not all Jewish Italian citizens had 
to give up their property which exceeded the approved limits (Levi, 1995). Instead, on a case-
by-FDVHEDVLVPDQ\H[FHSWLRQVZHUHPDGHIRUµGLVFULPLQDWHG¶-HZVAccording to the Royal 
Decree no. 1728 of 17th November 1938, expropriations and limits on property which could 
be owned by Jewish Italians did not apply to Jews and their relatives who either died or 
suffered as combatants in wars fought by Italy, notably the Italian-Turkish war (1911-12), the 
First World War (1915-18), the Ethiopian war (1935-36) and the Spanish war (1936-39), or 
who died or were injured for the Fascist cause. These measures introduced the so-called 
µ$U\DQLVHG-HZ¶DTXDOLILFDWLRQWKDWFRXOGEHFRQIHUUHGE\WKH0LQLVWHURIWKH,QWHULRUHYHQ
when information in the public registries of births, deaths and marriages said the opposite. In 
addition, Royal Decree no. 126/1939 ruled that Jewish property could be transferred to non-
Jewish relatives or to charities or foundations (RdI, 1939c). These exceptions meant that the 
law may not have been consistently enforced across the country. The total number of 
µGLVFULPLQDWHG¶-HZVboth owners and their families, provided for by the Law 1728/1938 was 
4815 or more than 10% of Italian Jews. In addition, special exemptions were recognized for 
another 194 Jewish citizens and their families (ACS, 1940). In terms of the value of 
properties, the percentage of land and buildings belonging to discriminated Jews (and not 
seized) was nearly 20% of the total real estate owned by Italian Jews (EGELI, 1941a, p.6; 
EGELI, 1942a, p.8; EGELI, 1943a, p.4). The preparedness of the Italians to protect where 
possible some Jews led Arendt to refer to the Italians as one of the most prominent examples 
of an exception to her judgement about the banality of bureaucracies for, she observes, the 
result of the permitted exemptions  
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 Other members of the Board of Statutory Auditors included: representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture 
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 At the time, there were neither laws nor auditing standards regulating audit procedures. 
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 The Ufficio Tecnico Erariale (UTE) was the local branch of the Ministry of Finance that searched and filed the 




must have been that the great majority of Italian Jews were exempted. There can hardly 
have been a Jewish family without at least one member in the Fascist Party, for this 
happened at a time when Jews, like other Italians, had been flocking for almost twenty 
years into the Fascist movement, since positions in the Civil Service were open only to 
members « (Arendt, 1964, p. 178). 
 
Unlike Nazi Germany, every owner of expropriated property was entitled to compensation 
prescribed by law as decided by the Revenue Assessment Office of the Ministry of Finance. 
$UWLFOHRI(*(/,¶VFKDUWHUVWLSXODWHGWKDWWhe Jewish owners at the time that their property 
was seized were to be paid by EGELI with, initially, special 30-year government bonds at 4% 
interest (RdI, 1939c; Anonymous, 1939c). On expiration of the 30-year term, the government 
bonds were to be replaced by Treasury bonds of the same value. Any difference between the 
final price at which the property was sold by EGELI and the compensation paid was taken by 
the State, not by the dispossessed owner. The compensation paid for property expropriated 
was still estimated on a fiscal basis which related the value of lands and buildings to the 
taxable rent using a conventional multiple, as noted earlier. This value was the basis for 
entering data in the accounting system of EGELI and initially that which was recorded at by 
the Revenue Office. 
 
In its first year of work, EGELI received, through the Provincial Tax Services, 726 notices 
from Jewish citizens about property that exceeded the approved property value limit and, 
thus, had been expropriated. By the 31st December 1940, these notices and subsequent 
expropriations had increased to 1000, which meant a total property value of 675,115,395 lire 
was transferred to EGELI (1941a, p.6) in preparation for the subsequent sale to non-Jewish 
Italians. As Italy entered the war, expropriations decreased significantly when the civil 
services were unable to meet demands now placed upon them and many Jewish or foreign 
properties were either sold by the owners before they could be valued and expropriated or the 
Jewish ownership of the property was disguised (EGELI, 1943a, p.8). In 1941, the number of 
notices issued in the year reduced to 255, with the total assets expropriated and managed by 
EGELI since its inception approaching nearly 700,000,000 lire (EGELI, 1942c, p.47). By the 
end of 1942 notices of property exceeding the approved value limit had again increased 
during the year to 395, while the value of the assets seized since the start of (*(/,¶V 
operations then totalled 726,508,449 lire (EGELI, 1943c, p.48). Table 3 shows that at 
December 1941, out of a possible 94 provinces, expropriated Jewish property came from just 
17 Italian provinces, those in which Jewish communities had traditionally lived (Sarfatti, 
2007). All such provinces were in Northern Italy, with the only exception Rome, home to the 
largest Jewish community, where racial persecution had the greatest financial impact 
(Procaccia, 2004).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
With the fall of Fascism in July 1943 and the proclamation of the Italian Social Republic in 
the northern part of the country, (*(/,¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV were moved from Rome to San 
Pellegrino Terme, in the Italian Social Republic14 (RSI, 1944b), from where it continued to 
manage under considerable stress the expropriation of the property of Jewish citizens who 
were now viewed as enemies (EGELI, 1944a, p.5; RSI, 1944b, 1944c). According to a report 
from the Ministry of Finance dated the 12th March 1945, the total expropriated assets 
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managed by EGELI throughout the war amounted to 731,442,619 lire, with a total of 5,768 
notices of expropriation (De Felice, 1993, pp.610-611). The surprisingly small increase in the 
property value seized by EGELI between 1942 and 1945 can be explained by the different 
approach used to calculate the value of property after the surrender of Italy. The 726,508,449 
lire of assets reported in 1942 referred to the total sum of the expropriation allowance without 
considering the amounts received from sales while, amid the chaos of the deteriorating 
position of the Fascists who were now in retreat, the final total of 731,442,619 lire calculated 
by the Repubblica of Salò considered only the net increase coming from the sales of the 
properties for which nothing had been paid: 726,508,449 + expropriation fees ± sales revenue 
= 731,442,619.  
 
After the end of the Second World War EGELI was put under the control of an external 
commissioner to VWDUW ³UH-conve\LQJ´ WKH unsold expropriated property that is returning it 
where possible to individuals or their families from whom the property had been expropriated. 
Irrespective of these efforts, very little property was returned (PCM, 1948-1950). Many of the 
original employees of EGELI retained their positions and assisted in attempts to find the 
owners of expropriated property. The ease with which members of EGELI moved between 
being implements of Fascist racial programs to facilitating the return of seized property 
further confirms the amoral way in which of EGELI officials carried out their duties. It 
WKHUHE\DOVRFRQILUPV$UHQGW¶VYLHZVRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHVHHPLQJEDQDOity of the work 
of bureaucracies involved in the persecution of Jews, while recognising the very different, 
non-extermination trajectory of the work of ,WDO\¶V bureaucrats.  
 
The Discourse of Discrimination in EGELI¶s Accounting Records 
The Annual Financial Statements which EGELI sent to the Ministry of Finance each year 
between 1940 and 1943 included a DirectRU¶V5HSRUWDEDODQFHVKHHW, an income statement, 
DVVRUWHGWDEOHVDQGWKH%RDUGRI6WDWXWRU\$XGLWRUV5HSRUW7KH'LUHFWRU¶V5HSRUWZDVXVXDOO\
about twenty pages long with a three-section introduction about the management of the three 
main categories of property, namely Jewish property, assets of Italians who had not paid their 
taxes, and enemy property. The final sections of the 'LUHFWRU¶VReport examined in detail the 
organization and work of EGELI. The Jewish property balance sheet, as shown in Table 4, 
listed as its main assets the Jewish property which had been expropriated (EGELI, 1941b, 
1942b, 1943b, 1944b). Expropriated property was to be recorded in the balance sheet at the 
cost, that is, the compensation paid for expropriation (Article 20)15. Any costs related to 
PDLQWHQDQFH RI WKH SURSHUW\ XQGHU (*(/,¶V FRQWURO ZHUH WR EH DGGHG WR WKH YDOXH RI WKH
DVVHWV ZKLOH WKH FRVW RI (*(/,¶V GD\-to-day operations was to be charged to the income 
statement as an expense (Article 23).  
 
Table 4 about here  
 
 
Significantly, gains coming from property sales (see Table 5) were not included in the income 
statements but in the balance sheet. As an example, in the 1941 the report of the Board of the 
6WDWXWRU\ $XGLWRUV LQ WKH µ-HZLVK 3URSHUW\¶ VHFWLRQ WKH\ ZURWH WKDW ³$ revenue of 570,000 
liras coming from property sales was gained at the end of the legal year, with a net gain of 
OLUH´(*(/,FS,QWKHEDODQFHVKHHWKRZHYHULQWKH$VVHWVHFWLRQFDQ
be found the amount of 265,266.20 lire (1941 column) and in the Liability section is the same 
amount and the gain achieved.  
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Table 5 about here 
 
 
Most sales occurred in 1941-EHIRUH,WDO\¶VVXUUHQGHU'XULQJWKLVWLPHWKHJDLQVIURPWKH
sale of land and buildings sold were more than double the compensation paid. Thus, the 
entries of the balance sheets provide a measure of the profits earned by the State through 
EGELI. According to Article 21 of the EGELI charter, the net revenues coming from the sales 
of properties were to be paid in cash directly to the State Treasury every month. 
Consequently, the property sales themselves had no impact on the income of EGELI (see 
Table 6). 
 
Table 6 about here 
  
 
The annual report presented by EGELI to the Ministry of Finance was completed with the 
audit reports. The audit report, which mostly consisted of four pages, although not in a 
standardized form, was divided into four parts with a conclusion. In the first section, the 
auditors commented on the main annual report data, the sales and the net profit. The second 
section was devoted to the Jewish property expropriated, including tables showing data about 
expropriations, sales and total number and value of EGELI properties at the reporting date. 
These tables, together with those included in the financial reports of the directors, were not 
consistently presented in the annual reports. The third and fourth sections of the audit report 
referred to the other activities of EGELI, such as dealing with the property of enemies and 
taxes. In the conclusions section the Board of Statutory Auditors gave its (clean) audit 
opinion, addressing this to the Minister of Finance (EGELI, 1941c; 1942c; 1943c; 1944c). 
 
The administrative banality of (*(/,¶V DFFRXQWV was very effective in disguising the true 
nature of what had happened, the betrayal and dispossession of Italian Jews, by creating the 
impression that they reflected typical, unenforced commercial transactions. The language, 
semantics and associated moral implications of accounting enabled tables of information, 
account names and calculations to disguise the identity of people, the lives behind numbers 
(Funnell, 1998), to dehumanise the victims by turning them into statistical categories and 
inventories (Kelman, 1973; Rose, 1999; Clegg, 2009). The style of language and the way 
eYHQWVDUHUHFRXQWHGLQWKH%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUV¶FRQILGHQWLDOGRFXPHQWVZKLFKDFFRPSDQ\WKH
financial statements also betrays more than a concern for procedural efficiency. The words 
that identified the victims and the expropriation of their property allowed the dehumanisation 
of the victims during the persecution of Italian Jews and, therefore, the separation between the 
PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI WKH EXUHDXFUDWV DQG WKH ³DGPLQLVWUDWLYH HYLO´ in which they were 
engaged (Kelman, 1973; Clegg et al, 2003). The accounting and narrative languages adopted 
by EGELI reports are exemplary in this regard. Early reports of the Board of Directors use the 
SKUDVH ³,WDOLDQ FLWL]HQV RI -HZLVK UDFH´ QRQ-VSHFLILFDOO\ (*(/, E S ,Q (*(/,¶V
accounting reports and related GRFXPHQWV VXFK DV WKH %RDUG RI 'LUHFWRUV¶ PLQXWHV
iQGLYLGXDOV ZHUH PRVWO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV PHPEHUV RI EURDG FDWHJRULHV VXFK DV ³WKH
GLVFULPLQDWHG´ ³-HZLVK FRPSDQLHV´ DQG ³WKH -HZ´ZKLFK LQ WKH VLQJXODU IRUP IRU ,WDOLDQV
has a pejorative intention. There are only isolated occurrences when specific individuals are 
mentioned by name, such as at a meeting on the 27th February 1941 when 31 expropriations 
are listed, along with the names of the Jewish citizens whose property had been expropriated 




January 1942 when seven names were provided (EGELI, 1942d, p.6-7), and in a meeting on 
the 25th February 1943, when nine names were disclosed. Nothing else is said about those 
named; nothing about their origin, their family or their personal story, at a time when Jews 
EHJDQ WR EH DUUHVWHG DQG GHSRUWHG 7KHUH LV RQO\ UHIHUHQFH WR µILOHV¶ µREMHFWV¶ WKH µ-HZLVK
SURSHUW\¶RUDOHJDOVWDWXVWKDW³RIWKHGLVFULPLQDWHGSHUVRQ´ZKLFKLVHQough to qualify for 
the attention of the Board of Directors the person who is mentioned.  
 
In a report from -XO\(*(/,ESDOLVWRIILJXUHVDERXWDEDQN¶VWUDQVDFWLRQV
PHUHO\ UHIHUV WR ³-HZLVK SURSHUW\´ DQG ³SURSHUW\ RI WKH GLVFULPLQDWHG SHUVRQ´ S $W D
meeting on the 6th November 1940 when statistics about Jewish properties are presented, 
UHIHUHQFH LV PDGH WR ³ DSSHDOV´ ³ ILOHV´ VHUYHG DQG ³ ILOHV´ \HW WR EH VHUYHG (*(/,
1940d, p.76). The phrase used to refer to those being tarJHWHGLV³)LOHQXPEHU'± First 
Name and Family Name16 ± 5HYHQXH 2IILFH RI $QFRQD´ 7KLV LV IROORZHG E\ D GHWDLOHG
description of the property (EGELI, 1943d, pp.7-8). Describing individuals in this way was, 
and still is, very unusual in Italian bureaucratic processes and related documents for it has 
long been the practice to specify the family name, the date and place of birth of the 
individuals concerned and where they lived. 7KH %RDUG¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR LPSOHPHQW WKH
racist policies of the regime without regard for the consequences for Jewish citizens were 
FOHDUO\HYLGHQW LQ WKHFROGEXUHDXFUDWLF ODQJXDJH LQ WKH5HSRUW ³8QGHU WKHDSSOLFDEOH
laws, in 1940 the Revenue Assessment Offices have kept collecting and processing 
certificates of Jewish owQHUVKLSUHSRUWLQJWRWKHERG\FRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHSURFHHGLQJV«´
(EGELI, 1941a, p.5). ,QWKHLU5HSRUW(*(/,¶V%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUVKDYLQJGLVFXVVHGLWV
performance and the problems it had encountered in expediting the expropriation of property, 




Throughout (*(/,¶V H[LVWence the annual %RDUG RI 'LUHFWRUV¶ 5HSRUW DGGUHVVHG WR WKH
Finance Ministry consistently referred to the expropriation, cataloguing and upkeep of 
expropriated property as a patriotic, Fascist duty. The Board of Directors wanted to ensure 
that the financial and operational details in the accounts would be seen as confirmation of 
their loyalty and commitment to the Fascist cause. This interpretation of the financial 
performance of EGELI would both highlight the significance of the numbers contained in the 
reports and their ideological meaning, thereby also confirming the propaganda values of the 
accounts. The %RDUG RI 'LUHFWRUV¶ 1940 Report notes that ³$W WKLV WLPH RI KDUVK WRXJK
fighting, the need was felt, deeper than ever, to fulfil our appointment as best as we could, 
while on the battlefields our fighters gloriously accomplish the sacred mission of giving Italy 
PLOLWDU\ YLFWRU\ D EULJKW IXWXUH´ (*(/, D S 7KH ]HDO DQG UKHWRULF RI (*(/,¶V
officials reflected how bureaucracies are known to reward and spread values such as self-
sacrifice, obedience, docility, duty and discipline (Bauman, 1989). The actions of 
bureaucracies, even when immoral, and their technologies are adapted to the rules prescribed 
by those in authority (Bos, 1997), implementing WKH UHJLPH¶V SROLFLHV DV UHTXLUHG E\ ODZ
(Mann, 2000).  
 
While the Board of Directors of EGELI emphasized its role and that of EGELI bureaucrats as 
uncompromising followers of the Fascist regime¶V policies and beliefs, as noted earlier there 
was not a consistent commitment to the racist agenda of the government throughout other 
organizations involved in the expropriation of property, especially the Ministry of Finance 
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and the Ministry of the Interior. Accordingly, DVIXUWKHUDWWHQXDWLRQV WR$UHQGW¶VFRQFHSt of 
banal evil, LQFLGHQWV RI FRUUXSWLRQ RU JRLQJ DJDLQVW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V ZLVKHV ZHUH QRW
uncommon. In one prominent case, to further confirm its devotion to the Fascist mission 
(*(/,¶V%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUVFRPSODLQVabout the two main Finance Ministry departments, the 
Revenue Assessment Office and the Revenue Office, for their poor efforts which were said to 
show a lack of commitment to the racial priorities of the Fascist government³7KH5HYHQXH
Assessment Office should therefore take more care of the JewLVK ILOHV«DQG WKH5HYHQXH
2IILFH VKRXOG EH TXLFNHU LQ DOORFDWLQJ VXUSOXV -HZLVK SURSHUW\ WR (*(/,´ (*(/, D
p.7-8). The Board of Directors mocks such laxity E\ DVVXPLQJ WKDW ³ZH VKRXOG H[SHFW WKH
ILOHVZRQ¶WEHIXOO\GLVSDWFKHGXQWLODERXW´(GELI, 1942a, p.9). Even though the Act 
which created EGELI specified a minimum value for Jewish property seizure in order to 
avoid long and expensive procedures to take control of low value properties, the Board of 
Directors were forced to criticise the Revenue Office for conveying expropriated property to 
EGELI when the property had little value, was in poor condition or was located in a 
particularly inaccessible area, with few buyers willing to pay profitable prices. EGELI had the 
authority to reject property seized by local agencies of the Ministry of Finance, the Revenue 
Offices, when it was considered of poor value and not saleable (RdI, 1939c, 1941). However, 
EGELI indicated that it needed to be allowed to judge the property before it was expropriated 
and, if necessary, reject it (EGELI, 1940a, p.39; EGELI, 1940c, p.59).  
 
The Board of Directors also complained about the way in which the law requiring the seizure 
of property was constructed which allowed Jews to avoid too easily the forced sale of their 
property to the State. In a report dated September 1940, which was highly critical of the 
category of the discriminated JewWKH%RDUGFRPSODLQVRIWKH³FXUUHQWODZVWKDWJLYH-HZVD
FKDQFH RI LPSOHPHQWLQJ VRPH GHOD\LQJ WDFWLFV «´ (*(/, F S 7Ke Board of 
Directors, using language which is clearly meant to communicate their commitment to the 
anti-6HPLWLFSULRULWLHVRIWKH)DVFLVWUHJLPHFRPSODLQVWKDW³,QWKLVZD\UHSRUWLQJ-HZVZLOO
keep all their properties until a conveyance ruling is issueG6XFKDORQJGHOD\«LVDOOWRWKH
GHWULPHQWRI(*(/,DQGWRWKHDGYDQWDJHRIWKH-HZV´(*(/,DSA 1940 Board 
of Directors Report UHYHDOV D ³WULFN´ used by Jews whose property was susceptible to 
expropriation, which possibly indicated a degree of sympathy among Italians for Jews to 
circumvent the seizure of property with the Jewish owner coming to an agreement with a non-
Jewish creditor to take over the property by foreclosure as collateral. The report stated that 
³7KH $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO RI WKH Court of Appeal of Turin ruled that such Jews cannot be 
formally prosecuted, but that such foreclosures, if on a large scale, would thwart the law and 
ZRXOGUHGXFH WKHDVVHWVRI(*(/,´7KHUHIRUH, the report continues, the Board of Directors 
calls the Finance Ministry to address the weakness in the law (EGELI, 1940a, p.33). In all 
WKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV(*(/,¶VWRSPDQDJHPHQWQRWRQO\DGKHUHVDVexplicitly as it can to the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQVWUXFWLRQV, it also offers suggestions and proposes bills of law to make the 
expropriation of Jewish property more impactful, faster and more certain. The Board of 






With the Fascists in retreat in 1943 and EGELI relocated to northern Italy after the south had 
been occupied by the Anglo-American forces, the chair of the Board of Directors was eager to 
reassure their Fascist masters that although ³(QHP\RFFupation of a large area of the national 




islands, I am most confident that the situation may be reinstated and that, after so many 
painful events, the occupied areas too may be reunited and annexed to the Italian Social 
5HSXEOLF´(*(/,DS ,Q WKHFLYLOZDUbetween Fascists and non-Fascists that had 
been raging in Italy for months, combined with the relentless allied bombing of the main 
,WDOLDQFLWLHV(*(/,¶s Board of Directors deceitfully boasts that the management of Jewish 
SURSHUWLHVKDVSURYLGHG³GHVSLWHWKHGLIILFXOWLHVHQFRXQWHUHG«, satisfactory SURILWV´(*(/,
1944a, p.21). Earlier in the same year the Royal decree n 26 of 20 January 1944, issued in 
µ)UHH ,WDO\¶ HVWDEOLVKHG WKH UHVWLWXWLRQ RI SURSHUW\ WR ,WDOLDQ DQG IRUHLJQ FLWL]HQV ZKR KDG
IRUPHUO\EHHQGHFODUHGRUFRQVLGHUHGWREHRI³-HZLVKUDFH´3&01948-1950, p. XXX). The 
issue was raised again immediately after the liberation of Rome, where a delegation of EGELI 
was still active with responsibility for the central regions and had continued its activities, even 
DIWHU(*(/,¶VWUDQVIHUWRWKH1RUWKRI,WDO\ 
 
In September 1944, the Finance Minister (of the Kingdom of Italy under Anglo-American 
Army occupation) envisaged the imminent closure of EGELI because its objectives had 
ceased to exist. However, the idea of a rapid closure of EGELI would be short-lived. 
Although the decree n 252 of 5th October 1944 authorized the return of formerly sequestered 
Jews property, after liberation it became increasingly difficult for EGELI to carry out the 
restitution of seized property in the Italian Social Republic. This was not only due to the vast 
amount of work and numbers involved but also the difficulty of getting an overall picture of 
the property situation. The organization had to contend with chaos, dispersed documents and 
abuse of power (PCM, 1948-1950). Moreover, from January 1945 EGELI also had to 
undertake the management of properties belonging to German subjects in Italy. EGELI 
continued to operate until it was closed on the 22nd March 1957, even though there still 
remained 66 properties which had not been returned, along with many other assets. Attempts 
to trace former property owners or their families to return property continued for another 40 
years (Governo Italiano, 2001). 
 
Discussion and concluding remarks  
Accounting researchers have exposed the deadly contributions of accounting to the cold, 
inhuman rationality of Nazi bureaucracies that implemented the greatest crime of the 20th 
century, the Holocaust. This study of Fascist Italy confirms that the ignominy, if not the scale 
and ultimate goals, of the brutal persecution of Jews was not exclusive to Nazi Germany in 
the 1930s and 1940s. This provides the means to further expose the culpability of accounting 
as a means of racial persecution beyond the territory controlled by the Nazis during the 
Second World War. Accounting made crucial contributions to a ministerial bureaucracy 
established specifically for the persecution of Italian Jews. However, unlike the very 
considerable literature on the fatal contributions of Nazi civil and military bureaucracies to the 
ruthless efficiency of the attempted annihilation of European Jews, which constituted a 
³JLJDQWLF PXUGHURXV RSHUDWLRQ´ (Muller-Hill, 1994, p.68; Katz, 1982; Bauman, 1989), the 
situation in Italy under the Fascist Party has yet to be given a comparable presence in either 
the accounting or broader historical literature. This study extends our knowledge of 
accounting as an instrument in the persecution of European Jews beyond that of Nazi 
Germany to Fascist Italy. This has also provided the opportunity to expose an aspect of 
totalitarian regimes, the expropriation of property, which has attracted little attention in the 
accounting literature. This study has shown how in the expropriation of Jewish property 
accounting used by the Italian Fascists was crucial to managing the seizure of Jewish 
property, its subsequent sale and the distribution of the funds received. It also provided the 
means for bureaucrats to separate and, thereby, absolve themselves from their immoral 





The study of EGELI as an institution in the service of the persecution of Italian Jews in the 
form of the expropriation of their lands and buildings extends the context of the theoretical 
insights developed by Hannah Arendt to a totalitarian regime in which the bureaucracies did 
not exhibit the same ruthless, amoral approach as those of the German Nazis (Arendt, 1958, 
1964). Nevertheless, property expropriation was a crucial stage in the persecution of Italian 
Jews and a more acceptable political alternative to the confiscation of property without any 
compensation, the approach used in the Third Reich (Hilberg, 2003). The evidence shows the 
H[LVWHQFHLQ)DVFLVW,WDO\RIDQ³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHHYLO´QXUWXUHGE\)DVFLVWUDFLDOOHJLVODWLRQDQG
policies $OWKRXJK WKHVH ODZV ZHUH QRW JHQRFLGDO WKH\ ³KHOSHG WR IDFLOLWDWH WKH ,WDOLDQ
Holocaust by weakening the Jewish community and gathering extensive information about its 
PHPEHUVKLS «´ (Livingston, 2014, p.2). Government bodies associated with the work of 
EGELI, such as the Revenue Office, involved ordinary people in the organization of the 
statistical, fiscal, financial, managerial activities necessary to expropriate and sell Jewish 
properties. Procedures were demanded and planned to solve all the problems related to the 
expropriation of property in which the seeming banality of accounting played a crucial role.  
 
Accounting practices used by EGELI and associated government departments provided the 
means to manage in an efficient way the resources acquired from the persecution of Italian 
Jews with the seizure and disposal of their property (Funnell, 1998, 2013, 2015). The 
accounting and administrative records of EGELI show consistent and compelling evidence of 
the manner in which accounting helped strengthen the identity and purposes of an 
organization in charge of selling expropriated property of Italian citizens of Jewish descent. 
The dHWDLOV SURYLGHG LQ (*(/,¶V DFFRXQWV JDYH WKH 0LQLVWU\ WKH means to oppress Jewish 
Italian property owners by requiring that their lands and buildings should be listed, valued, 
recorded and sold (Funnell, 1998). These tools which were to promote bureaucratic efficiency 
show clearly the vital role of accounting in the service of Jewish persecution. In the charter 
that governed the actions and authority of EGELI there were many rules about financial 
reporting, in particular the need imposed by the law which established EGELI (RdI, 1939c) to 
prepare financial statements about its operations (Article 11, par. 8). The annual reports were 
prepared by the Board of Directors (Article 10) and audited by the Board of Statutory 
Auditors (Article 12). Even though EGELI was a government body, its annual report was 
quite similar to that prepared by private companies. Accounting practices were not always 
consistent either across years or with basic accounting practices. As the war worsened for 
Italy this in part reflected the increasing pressures on EGELI to find staff with the necessary 
accounting skills and the inability of the government bodies upon which it depended, most 
especially the Ministry of Finance, to provide a stable environment amid the growing chaos of 
war whiFK IRU (*(/, FXOPLQDWHG LQ LWV KXUULHG PRYH WR WKH QRUWK LQ  DIWHU ,WDO\¶V
surrender.  
 
Although EGELI worked in a totalitarian regime that was notably different from Nazi 
Germany it still exhibited many of the traits that have been associated with the bureaucratic 
organizations emphasised in Arendt¶V work. The top management of the organization, 
selected from Fascist army generals, senators, government executives, was ideologically 
motivated to pursue the mission of the Board of Directors. When it had to contend with the 
typical slow pace of Italian bureaucracy outside EGELI it complained that these delays would 
³DEHW´WKH-HZLVK interests. In marked contrast, (*(/,¶VWDIIZere often praised by the Board, 
thereby confirming that they too were diligent and devoted to the organization¶VPLVVLRQThe 




irrespective of the consequences for those who were the target of Fascist anti-Semitism 
(Browning, 1983; Mack, 2010; Minnich, 2013).  
 
7KH ZRUN RI (*(/,¶V PDQDJHPHQW DQG VWDII ZDV GULYHQ E\ LQVWUXPHQWDO UDWLRQDOLW\ LQ WKH
pursuit of the goals to be accomplished, not moral considerations (Browning, 1983; Mack, 
2010; Minnich, 2013). Clegg (2009) has shown how the development of technologies of total 
institutional power, such as the accounting practices used by EGELI, is based on the building 
of categories of people, the automatism of the organizational routines, on distancing oneself 
from the persecuted people and the denial of tKHLUKXPDQLW\)XQQHOO:KLOH$UHQGW¶V
views on WKH³%DQDOLW\RI(YLO´JLYHDJOLPSVHRIWKHUDFLVWFKDUDFWHURIEXUHDXFUDF\ in Nazi 
Germany and other totalitarian regimes17, the arbitrary nature of its functioning, if compared 
with the rule of law, and the peculiar aspect of racially-based moral aloofness (Shenhav, 
2013), in EGELI the principle of lawfulness was unfailingly adhered to, as were anti-Semitic 
attitudes. EGELI operated in a totalitarian regime that may have differed in many aspects 
from that of Nazi Germany but still exhibited most of the traits that are associated with 
bureaucratic organizations and the bureaucrats that Arendt refers to in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem. EGELI reflected the functional picture described by Bauman (1989) where 
bureaucratic procedures ruled all administration and a reliance placed upon means-ends 
analyses facilitated by accounting information, especially when the organization¶V WRS
management wanted to reject properties that had little value. There is no evidence in the 
DUFKLYDO UHFRUGV WKDW (*(/,¶V WRS PDQDJHPHQW HYHU TXHVWLRQHG WKH PRUDOLW\ RI ZKDW WKH\
were doing. Instead, as shown, they would harshly criticise the poor efforts made by the other 
governmental institutions involved, which were suspected of abetting the Jews to escape 
expropriation of their property (Bos, 1997). 0XFK WR WKH IUXVWUDWLRQ RI (*(/,¶V %RDUG RI
Directors, as similar level of devotion to the Fascist cause did not always drive the work of 
other government bureaucracies with whom they had to work. 
 
Far from being a neutral tool of management (Solomons, 1991), accounting, which was set in 
the context of a racist oriented dictatorship, was fully involved in the organizational work of 
the ministerial bureaucracy that was intent on the persecution oI -HZV LQ ,WDO\ (*(/,¶V
accounting system allowed the identification of property exceeding the value specified for 
expropriation and carefully measured the performance of the expropriation process and sales 
of Jewish property. Not only had such work to be carried out on the basis of a race law, it also 
had to be profitable and accountable. This required accounting systems which would make the 
discrimination and persecution of Jews more efficient and visible to ensure that those 
responsible for the process knew that they would be held accountable for the success of the 
process (La Capra, 1994; Funnell, 1998; Fleischman and Funnell, 2007). Thus, the Annual 
Financial Statements of EGELI made it certain that they would be held accountable to the 
Finance Ministry for their commitment to Fascist values and aims. 
 
Disclosing the profitability of expropriation in the Annual Financial Statements confirmed 
each year to the Ministry, and indirectly to Mussolini, that those who worked in EGELI were 
devoted to its mission as an agency of the Fascist State (EGELI, 1941a, p. 28). By making the 
expropriated and then sold property visible the information provided in the Annual Financial 
6WDWHPHQWV DOVR VXSSRUWHG WKH UHJLPH¶VSURSDJDQGD WKDW -HZVZHUH D WKUHDW WR WKH ILQDQFLDO 
stability of the State. The Annual Financial Statements hid the real effect of expropriation 
authorised by the Royal Decree 126/1939, the denial of the civil rights of Italian Jews, which 
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allowed the State to appropriate the difference between the compensation paid and the actual 
selling price of property expropriated. This confirmed the role of accounting as a technology 
to reveal what the regime had achieved and its priorities but also to hide or disguise that 
which it did not want to be known (Annisette, 2009; Funnell, 2013). Accounting allowed a 
form of selective visibility; the value and identity of the property was identified but not that of 
the owners. This provided the means to dehumanise the victims, and therefore the separation 
between the moral rHVSRQVLELOLW\RI WKHEXUHDXFUDWV DQG WKH³DGPLQLVWUDWLYH HYLO´. This was 
consistently reinforced by the words that were used to identify the victims and the 
expropriation of their property (Kelman, 1973; Clegg et al., 2003). Despite the nature of their 
worNWKHODQJXDJHXVHGLQWKH%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUV¶DFFRXQWLQJUHFRUGVDQGUHSRUWVZDVFROG
and neutral, rarely identifying the people affected. The emphasis was on transactions, prices, 
the value of property and the timely manner in which the procedure was carried out. The 
inhumanity of the bureaucracies involved is again FRQILUPHGLQ(*(/,¶VDFFRXQWLQJSUDFWLFHV
by the silences, the omissions, replacement of the names of Jewish people with bureaucratic 
phrases or descriptions of the property. This fully supports &OHJJ¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKH
development of technologies of total institutional power is based on the building of categories 
of people, the automatism of the organizational routines, on distancing oneself from the 
persecuted people (Clegg, 2009. 
 
The findings of this study recognise the need for further research on the role played by 
servicemen, bureaucrats and accounting as a technology of government in the management of 
Italian concentration camps and the deportation of Italian Jews to Germany. Also, attention is 
focussed on one stage of the racial discrimination of Jews in Italy, the expropriation of 
property. The evidence used by the paper, which relies mainly on that preserved in official 
public sources, could also be enriched by seeking details from the private records and 
correspondence of families affected by the expropriation of property. This survey of property 
expropriation could be extended to the other expropriations that occurred in Italy after 1938, 
in particular bank accounts in Italian and international banks. Finally, there is the opportunity 
to examine how other countries managed the properties confiscated or expropriated from the 
Jews before moving on to the Final Solution.  
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